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This paper is an attempt to provide an analysis of the European wine policy through the evolution of 
indicators of support producers dedicated using two of the most well know and used OECD’ indicators: 
the Producer Support Estimate (PSE) and Producer Single Commodity Transfer (PSCT). The works 
focus on the different between wine and others three agricultural PSCT from 1986 to 2012: common 
wheat, milk and rice, with the goal of comparing different agricultural PSCT and to highlight the high 
different support. PSCT calculations do not include much of the EU wine budgetary support (such as 
distillation measures) considered within the classification of payments based on non-commodity 
criteria. As a consequence, PSCT value of wine is lower than what one would expect. The reduction is 
also due to negotiations in the WTO – Uruguay Round of the GATT, which required a reduction in 
protection (tariff and non tariff barriers), aimed to eliminate all agricultural policies with a distortive 
effect on trade flows and export subsidies. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
In the course of its evolution, the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), and the wine sector cannot be excluded, has 
been accompanied by a number of structural measures 
with direct or indirect environmental objectives in terms of 
protection and control (Kay, 2003). The strong arm of the 
CAP was based on direct support measures implemented 
through price intervention, a high level of customs 
protection and setting a guaranteed average price. In the 
same manner, indirect support measures were also 
activated at national level with the aim of bringing 
agricultural income into line with   that   of  other  economic   
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sectors. The action taken to regulate markets, immediately 
became closely “coupled” (until 1992) to the quantity 
produced and characterized by a high level of protection. 
The way that support differed from one product to another 
would go on to become characteristic of the CAP 
throughout its history, generating real imbalances between 
agriculture in the north of Europe and the Mediterranean. 
The result was the increase of the European Union (EU) 
cost for support this system (once applied, the market 
policy absorbed the majority of the available European 
financial resources) and after 57 years the CAP still 
remains its position as the largest component of EU 
expenditure, accounting for approximately 39% of the total 
EU budget for the period 2014-2020.The financial 
agreement contained a budget for Europe of €960 billion 
(2014–2020). 
  
 
 
 
 
Out of the budget, 38.9 percent is destined for the 
agricultural sector (more than €370 billion in total), 33.9% 
percent is allocated for the cohesion policy for growth and 
development (around €325 billion), 13.1 percent is for 
research and technology, 6.1 percent is for international 
affairs, 6.4 percent is for administration, and 1.6 percent is 
for internal affairs (EU Commission and Parliament, 2013). 
This paper is an attempt to provide an analysis of the 
European wine policy through the evolution of indicators of 
support producers dedicated (from 1986 to 2012) using two 
of the most well know and used OECD’ (Economic 
Cooperation and Development): the Producer Support 
Estimate (PSE)  and Producer Single Commodity Transfer 
(PSCT). The works focus on the different between wine 
and others three agricultural PSCT: common wheat, milk 
and rice, all of them were strongly supported by the CAP, 
with the objective of comparing different agricultural PSCT 
(and EU Budget Expenses on wine as % of production 
value) and to highlight the high difference support. The 
paper is organized as follows: in the section called 
“materials and methods”, we discuss, in the first part, the 
concepts and methodologies used to calculate the PSE 
and PSCT, including the wine index. The methodology 
here used is the standard one proposed by the OECD. In 
the second part, we will present a briefly overview of the 
EU wine policies from its inception in 1962 until the last 
reform in 2013 (under CAP Reform) and focus on the effect 
of support on wine stocks and production in the major EU 
wine producing countries (France, Italy, Spain, Germany 
and Portugal). Finally, in the last part, we present the 
results and discussion on the general PSE wine level and 
the different between wine and others PSCT, in the context 
of the EU agricultural policy.  
 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS  
 
1) PSE and PSCT: concepts and methodologies  
   
Josling in the early 1970s’ was the first author developed 
the use of the PSE/CSE (Consumers Support Estimate) 
method to estimate assistance to agriculture, although the 
theoretical foundation may be found in the work of Corden 
(1971) and adopted by the OECD in implementing the 
1982 Ministerial Trade Mandate. From 1990’s during the 
Uruguay Round of GATT, the PSE methodology was 
developed with the aim to monitor agricultural support for 
basic commodities in world trade (Cahill and Legg, 1990; 
Alston et  al. 2010).  
PSE represents the annual monetary value of gross 
transfers from consumers and taxpayers to agricultural 
producers, measured at the farm-gate level, arising from 
policy measures that support agriculture, regardless of 
their nature, objectives or  impacts  on  farm  production  or  
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income (OECD) (PSE) states: “the payment that would be 
required to compensate  farmers   for   the  loss  of  income  
resulting from the removal of a given policy measure”. The 
nomenclature and definitions of this indicator replaced the 
former Producer Subsidy Equivalent in 1999. The term 
“subsidy equivalent” came from the economic theory of 
protection developed in the 1960s to evaluate the effects of 
tariffs (Corden, 1971). According to this, the producer 
subsidy is the payment per unit of output that a 
government would have to pay producers to generate the 
same impact on production as that policy measure. PSE 
can be expressed in three ways: i) as the total value of 
transfers to the commodity produced; ii) as the total value 
of transfers per unit of the commodity produced; and iii) as 
the total value of transfers as a percentage of the total 
value of production including transfers: a % PSE means 
that the estimated value of transfers to individual producers 
from consumers and taxpayers is equivalent to a 
percentage of gross farm receipts (OECD, 2013). In 
algebraic form, the PSE estimations as measured by 
OECD are shows in equation 1:  
PSE = MPS +∑BOT =∑ PSE +(sub) Category [1] 
BOT =  (Β + C+D + E + F + G + H)      [2] 
 
Where:  
 
MPS, is the Market Price Support or the transfers from 
consumers and taxpayers to agricultural producers arising 
from policy measures that create a gap between domestic 
market prices and border prices of a specific agricultural 
commodity, measured at the farm gate level; the MPS is 
the difference in production value (Qd) at domestic prices 
(Pd) and production value by reference (world) prices (Pw).  
BOT is an aggregate Budgetary and Other Transfer to 
producers from policies for specific countries. This indicator 
occurs in various forms. The most common, according to 
the OEC manual, and file dataset, are: 1) Actual payments 
to producers, or 2) reduced budget revenues. B. Payments 
based on input use as transfers from taxpayers to 
agricultural producers arising from policy measures based 
on on-farm use of inputs: B.1. Variable input use as 
transfers reducing the on-farm cost of a specific variable 
input or a mix of variable inputs. B.2. Fixed capital 
formation: transfers reducing the on-farm investment cost 
of farm buildings, equipment, plantations, restructuring and 
reconversion expenditures (in the case of wine sector – as 
show in table 1).  B.3. On-farm services: transfers reducing 
the cost of technical, accounting, commercial, sanitary and 
phyto-sanitary assistance, and training provided to 
individual farmers. C. Payments based on current A/An/R/I, 
production required as a transfers from taxpayers to 
agricultural producers arising from policy measures based 
on current area (A), animal numbers (An), receipts (R) or 
income (I), and requiring  production.  D.  Payments  based  
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                     Table 1. The Producer Support Estimate index linked to the wine sector 
 
 
                Source: Authors’ own creation from OECD Producer and Support Estimates database, index table. 
 
 
 
on non-current A/An/R/I, production required: transfers 
from taxpayers to agricultural producers arising from policy 
measures based on non-current (i.e. historical or fixed) 
area, animal numbers, receipts or income, with current 
production of any commodity required. E. Payments based 
on non-current A/An/R/I, production not required: regards 
the transfers from taxpayers to agricultural producers 
arising from policy measures based on non-current (i.e. 
historical or fixed) area, animal numbers, receipts or 
income, with current production of any commodity not 
required but optional. F. Payments based on non-
commodity criteria: transfers from taxpayers to agricultural 
producers arising from policy measures based on: F.1. 
Long-term resource retirement: transfers for the long-term 
retirement of factors of production from commodity 
production. The payments in this sub-category are 
distinguished from those requiring short-term resource 
retirement, which are based on commodity production 
criteria. F.2. A specific non-commodity output is considered 
a transfers for the use of farm resources to produce 
specific non-commodity outputs of goods and services, 
which are not required by regulations. F.3. Other non-
commodity criteria: transfers provided equally to all 
farmers, such as a flat rate or lump sum payment. Finally, 
G. Miscellaneous payments: transfers from taxpayers to 
farmers for which there is insufficient information to 
allocate them among the appropriate categories (OECD, 
2000; 2008 and 2012). Table 1 summarizes the list of PSE 
index linked to the wine sector and its intervention. 
Most often, this indicator shows the values in the form of 
percentage PSE (%PSE). The relative agrarian equation is:  
% PSE = PSE/(PdQd + BP)*100                [3] 
Where:  
 
A) Support based on 
commodity output 
A1) MPS – Market Price Support 
A2) Payments based on 
output 
- National output payments for wine 
B) Payment based on input 
use 
B1) Variable input use - Agri-monetary (Labour insurance 35%) Wine 
B2) Fixed capital formation 
- Restructuring and conversion of 
vineyards 
- Vineyard restructuring national 
expenditures 
B3) On-farm services 
 
C) Payments based on 
current A/An/R/I, production 
required 
- Vineyard restructuring 
- Premium for the conversion of vineyards 
- Vineyard restructuring 
- Payments for wine in most remote regions 
- Per hectare payments for raisins 
- Area payments for wine  national expenditures 
- Payments for integrated production of wine  RDR expenditures 
- Payments for integrated production of wine  national expenditures 
- Vineyard improvement/restructuring  national expenditures 
D) Payment based on non – current A/An/R/I, production required 
E) Payment based on non-commodity criteria not required 
F) Payment based on non-
commodity criteria 
F1) Long term resource 
retirement 
- - Permanent abandonment premiums in 
respect of areas under vine 
- - Grubbing up  (wine reform 2007) 
- - Abandonment areas under vines 
- - Premium for abandonment of area under 
vines (Prime cessation viticulture) 
- - Abandonment of vine growing and wine 
making (Abandon of surface) 
- - Permanent abandonment of areas under 
vines  national expenditures 
F2) A specific non commodity output 
F3) Other non commodity criteria 
G) Miscellaneous payments - Wine others 
  
 
 
 
 
PdQd = production value expressed in producers prices, 
BP = budgetary payments to producers. 
The OECD’s uses two main indicators to show the level 
of support to individual producers at the commodity level: 
the producer NPC (Producer Nominal Protection 
Coefficient) and % of PSCT.  Here, the authors will focus 
on PSCT evolution. This indicator represents the value of 
gross transfers from consumer and taxpayers to 
agricultural producers at farm gate level, arising from policy 
measures directly linked to the production of a single 
commodity that the producer must produce with the 
intention of receiving the transfer (OECD, PSE manual 
2008). PSCT is calculated by adding market price support 
(MPS) and the ∑ of the value of budgetary and other 
transfers. According to this, the algebraic equations are: 
% PSCTs = Wine specific transfers / value of receipts from 
Wine production             [4] 
% PSCTs = Milk specific transfers / value of receipts from 
Milk production            [5] 
% PSCTs = Rice specific transfers / value of receipts from 
Rice production           [6] 
% PSCTs = Common Wheat specific transfers / value of 
receipts from CW production       [7] 
All the data was collected from the OECD website and are 
referred to the EU with 27 countries from 1986 to 2012.   
 
2) European wine policy: interventions and 
implications  
 
The EU wine system is regulated by the Common Market 
Organization (CMO). The wine CMO is the legal and 
regulatory basis of the European wine market, covering 
everything from vineyards to wine production, and in terms 
of its scope it is one of the most complex structures within 
the Agricultural Policy. Under the framework of the CAP in 
1962, the CMO was created in order to enable a gradual 
convergence of prices and the elimination of customs 
barriers, with the goal of establishing a single market for 
products with one common customs tariff for the rest of the 
world. From 2007 all the agriculture products were 
governed by the Single CMO (Reg. 1234/2007). It replaced 
all 21 CMOs created between 1962 and 1971. The wine 
has been included in the single CMO in 2009, after the 
2008 reform. The CMO wine has gradually been 
established with the aim of improving productivity and 
quality, supporting the income of wine producers, and 
maintaining a balance between supply and demand. In 
1970 were published two formal CMO wine regulations 
relating table wine, with the goal of market intervention to 
regulated the wine surplus a rules concerning production 
and for controlling planting; and regulation for quality wine. 
These two policies kept their autonomy for 29 years, until 
1999 (Meloni and Swinnen, 2013). The most important 
regulations being adopted in 1987 (Reg. 822/1987) and 
then in 1999 (Reg. 1493/99). After less than ten  years  the  
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new reform entered into force on 1st August 2009 (Reg. 
479/2008).  
For many decades now, the European wine market has 
suffered recurring overproduction problems, although the 
scale of the imbalance has risen and fallen over time. 
However, the action to rebalance of the market was a 
dominant concern at the dawn of the revision of Reg. 
1493/99. In particular, the EU Commission has repeatedly 
expressed the need for drastic action on the surplus of the 
system called “structural”. The problem of overproduction 
and expenditure were addressed by means of a policy of 
limiting production potential, with a “quota” on new 
plantations, an incentive for the permanent abandonment 
of production through a grubbing-up premium (from 2009-
2011: in three years was grubbed up in Europe 161.167 
ha; the maximum quota was 175 000 ha in three years) 
with total cost of 1.024.623 million of euro, Gaeta and 
Corsinovi, 2014) and a gradual withdrawal of distillation 
subsidies until 2012 (phasing out measure) for crisis 
distillation, potable alcohol distillation and the use of 
concentrated grape must measures. The planting rights 
scheme is seen as a fundamental building block of the 
EU’s policies for controlling wine production. The 
underlying reason behind the creation of this kind of 
intervention was the increasing imbalance on the wine 
market at the time, coupled with the sector’s tendency to 
create surpluses. At the same time, EU wine consumption 
has decreased significantly and steadily in recent decades. 
Wine consumption in Europe has shown a significant and 
continuous decline in the last decades, falling by an 
average of 750.000 hl per year, or 15 million hl in the last 
twenty years, although in the most recent years the decline 
in consumption has been less pronounced (Gaeta and 
Corsinovi, 2014; Proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
CMO wine and amending certain regulations. Brussels, 4 
July 2007).Together with over production and wine 
decrease, one of the greatest fears for the EU 
Commission, was the “attack” of new wine players on EU 
market. Since 1996, the volume of wine imports into the 
EU-25 has been growing at a rate of 10% a year, reaching 
almost 11.8 million hl in 2005. So-called “new world” wines 
have gained considerable market share from EU wines. 
The measure of promotion in third countries was 
established with market oriented in order to recover the 
market share from EU wines. The last one changing of the 
wine sector is represented by the Regulation 1308/2013 
within the Single CMO package. The new single CMO is 
part of the CAP reform (2014-2020) approved in December 
2013. Analyzing the budget forecast for wine the sector, we 
find no major differences between it and the previous years 
apart from a slight drop in 2015. The budgetary limits for 
National Support Programs is 1.248.913 million of € in 
2014 and 1.105.054 million of € in 2015-16-17. The 
majority CMO funds are allocated in historical viticulture 
countries, such as Spain,  France   and   Italy   (Gaeta  and  
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Corsinovi, 2014). Compared to the previous CMO wine, 
Regulation 1308/2013 provides for more streamlined 
national programs support (NPS) with only eight eligible 
measures rather than 11: 1) Promotion this measure 
covers public relations, promotional or advertising 
measures and participation at events, fairs or exhibitions of 
international importance in third countries with the aim to 
improving EU competitiveness in those countries. 2) 
Restructuring and Reconversion It was 1980, when this aid 
was first created. It was a measure which would turn out to 
be fundamental for the development of a wine-production 
sector which was increasingly concerned with containing 
its production potential. Today, EU support for actual costs 
may not exceed 50% and contributions to restructuring and 
conversion costs shall not exceed 75%. 
3) Green Harvesting was introduced in 2008 with the aim 
of supplying grape management. This provides for the total 
destruction or removal of bunches of grapes while still at 
an immature stage, thereby reducing the yield to zero. 
   Green harvesting was introduced in 2008 with the aim of 
supplying grape management. This provides for the total 
destruction or removal of bunches of grapes while still at 
an immature stage, thereby reducing the yield to zero 
4) Mutual funds support for setting up mutual funds was 
created in order to provide assistance to producers seeking 
to insure themselves against market fluctuations. The 
measure is subject to regional choices and covers the 
amounts paid by the mutual fund to holders of financial 
compensation. This has never been applied. 5) Harvest 
Insurance 6) Investments 7). Innovation Investments shall 
be intended to improve the overall performance of the 
enterprise and its adaptation to market demands, as well 
as to increase its competitiveness, and shall concern the 
production or marketing of grapevine products; Innovation 
in wine research and competitiveness of firms. 
8) By product distillation: all measures are programmed 
for 2014–2018 and there are no phasing-out measures. 
National support programs are managed directly by the 
member states. They are applied and managed according 
to objective criteria and take into account the economic 
situation of the producers concerned, as well as the need 
to avoid unjustified unequal treatment of producers. 
The new programs no longer contain potable alcohol 
distillation, crisis distillation, aid for grape must, or aid for 
the use of concentrated grape must. Despite the fact that 
the overarching aim of all the agricultural and wine 
historical reforms had been to control supply and reduce 
spending, the gap between products (wine) surplus and 
demand had become unsustainable and the measures 
adopted had not provided any solution.  
The following graph (Graph.1) compares production in 
the main European wine countries and level of stocks (all 
information were obtained from EU, DG Agri sources). The 
data demonstrates that wine stocks have continued to rise 
despite      multiple   policy    interventions   to   attempt   to  
 
 
 
 
control them since 1962.  Between 1981 and 2012, the 
level of European wine stocks grew steadily from vintage 
1984/1985 and 1998/99. The EU’s problem with surplus 
production, which had first developed in the 1970s, had 
worsened and by the early 1980s not only could the 
markets no longer absorb the produce, there seemed to be 
no stopping the uncontrollable supply. Italy produced 84 
million hectoliters in 1983, of which 75 million hectoliters 
was table wine (Pomarici et al., 2009). From 1994 wine 
stock levels were progressively increased. However, 
distillation measures adopted in the past effectively 
resulted in transferring the structural surplus issue from the 
wine sector to the alcohol sector at huge cost (Gaeta and 
Corsinovi 2014). The distillery paid the producer a 
minimum price, which varied depending on the quantity 
and type of wine or wine by-product to be distilled. In turn, 
the distillery received support for the distillation, which was 
calculated in such a way as to compensate for the 
difference between the distillery’s costs (the minimum price 
paid for the wine and the distillation costs) and the 
alcohol’s market price. These payments came out of the 
Community budget and expenditure for distillation reached 
incredibly high levels, reaching between 65% and 77% of 
total spending for the wine sector in 1983-84. For example, 
the cost of alcohol produced from wine reached around 
388 ECU /hl by the end of the 1980s; far too high when 
compared with the cost of synthetic alcohol (35-41 ECU/hl) 
and alcohol from cereals (56-63 ECU /hl). As a result, due 
to its high cost, alcohol produced from wine was stockpiled 
(Special Report No. 4/87 – GU C 297 of 6 November 1987). 
The European Agricultural Commission’s efforts to dispose 
of these stocks by sending them to the fuel production 
sector were not a great success despite offering the 
alcohol at a price lower than production cost. Looking at 
the EU main producer countries, we can see that between 
2000 and 2011 France, Italy and Spain all reported gradual 
increases in stock levels. From 2009-2013, the stocks 
progressively decreased probably as a consequence of 
grubbing up system (2009-2011), abolition of distillation 
measures from 2012.  
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
As mentioned before, most of the EU wine supports was 
linked to regulated the level of stocks, and managing the 
supply; graphic 1 clearly shows how inefficient the 
measures thus far adopted by the Commission had 
become at the end of the 20th century and beginning of the 
21st century.  
To confirm this, the estimate from OECD on the PSE and 
PSCT could be an interesting tool of this analysis, though 
with limitations as show below. The results confirm that the 
level of protection enjoyed by wine in the EU is significantly 
below that benefiting all other agricultural  commodities.  In  
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                               Graph 1. The main wine producer countries and the level of European wine stocks 
 
 
 
 
                           Source: Authors’ creation from Gaeta and Corsinovi, 2014 and European Commission Wine Statistics, 2014. 
 
                              Graph 2. The % PSCT of wine, milk, rice and common wheat and EU budget expenses on wine from 1986 to 2012  
 
 
 
                      Source: Authors’ own creation from OECD Producer and Support Estimates database, 2014, European Commission, 2007-2012.  
 
 
 
particular, the PSE for wine is less than half the average 
support enjoyed by the other agricultural products. The 
graphic 2, demonstrates comparing wine with others three 
agricultural PSTC: common   wheat,   milk,   and  rice.  The  
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Table 2. Total Value of Production at farm gate and Agricultural Support Estimate, 1986-2012 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own creation from OECD Producer and Support Estimates database, 2014. 
 
 
choice of comparing different agricultural products is to 
highlight the high difference support and measures, 
including different types of pressure group (Gaeta and 
Corsinovi, 2014). All of them were strongly supported by 
the CAP. In the EU support is notoriously concentrated on 
products such as cereals, sugar, beef and veal, and 
dairies, which are also the most important products in 
terms of the value of production. Until the Mac Sharry 
reform in 1992, common wheat and rice were sustained 
through “coupled” payments to the quantity produced. The 
decoupling introduced by the reform market the passage 
from price support to direct income, which translated into a 
transfer of costs from consumers to the Community 
budget. Until 1990’ there was an overall increase in 
expenditure from the EAGGF of 70% accompanied by an 
increase in the quantity produced of 20%, a fall in prices of 
27% and a drop in value-added per employee of 30%. Of 
that spending, nearly 45% was intended for the dairy 
sector alone, with just under 15% for cereals, 9-10% for 
sugar and 7-8% for beef. Wine was afforded a low level of 
protection with its impact on EAGGF expenditure being 
around 4.5 % (Fanfani, 1990). 
This definitive abandonment of coupled support, on 
which the EU had founded its original policy, put an end to 
the agricultural model based on production and paved the 
way for a new model based on the market and on the 
sustainability of rural development. 
Looking graphic 2 EU transfers to wine producers went 
from around 7.21 percent in 1986 to 9.40 percent in 1991, 
were 5.05 percent in 2001 and 0.21 percent in 2012. Milk, 
however, showed values almost ten times higher. In 1986 
EU transfers to milk producers were around 72 percent, 
whereas they were 48.18 in 1991, 28.35 percent in 2001, 
and 1.90 percent in 2012. Analyzing the rice support, the 
value seems to be even higher than that of common wheat. 
However, from 1988 to 1995 and from 2004 to 2014 the 
percentage values are higher than milk. In details, in 1986 
EU transfers to rice producers were around 55.92 while 
51.40 percent for common wheat; whereas  they  were 
54.87 percent in 1991, for rice and 51.79 percent for wheat 
28.35 percent in 2001 and almost zero for both in 2012 
(Gaeta and Corsinovi, 2014b). The PSE show in table 2 is 
an indicator of the value of the transfers from domestic 
consumers and taxpayers to producers resulting from a 
given set of agricultural policies, at a point in time. Thus the 
PSEs are aggregate measures of the total monetary value 
of the assistance to output and inputs on a commodity-by-
commodity basis, associated with agricultural policies. The 
measure of PSE and PSCT are most meaningful as an 
indicator of relative, not absolute, levels of transfers and in 
showing the transfers resulting from changes in policies 
(OECD, 2000). As shown also by Meloni and Swinnen 
(2013) on the comparison between the wine PSCT and EU 
budget for wine, PSCT calculations do not include much of 
the EU wine budgetary support. These ∑   do   not include:  
the incentive for the grubbing-up scheme, the premium for 
abandonment area, aid for the use of must, national 
support programs, buying-in alcohol from compulsory 
distillation (considered within the classification of payments 
based on non-commodity criteria), and general service 
support estimates. In this ∑ PSTC calculations do not 
include much of the EU wine budgetary support.  These 
budget expenditures were on average around 1 billion 
euros per year over the same period—with a peak in 1988 
of 1.5 billion euros and corresponding to 11% of the 
production value. However, within the subsidies, the OECD  
EU 27  
  
Unit 
Average Value  Years 
1986 
1990 
1991 1996 2001 2006 
2011 2012 
1995 2000 2005 2010 
Total Value of Production 000 tons 219,451.09 242,921.07 239,815.19 257,163.60 315,749.52 358,175.46 370,525,15 
of which, Share of MPS commodities  (%) 74.84 73.92 73.96 72.93 72.69 74.55 74.28 
Producer Support Estimate  (PSE) ECUmn 83,873.99 91,359.12 96,463.32 99,548.36 89,357.69 76,505.08 83,227.78 
PSE Wine  996.33 1,152.15 804,42 864.07 617.64 32.5 35.1 
  A)   Support based on commodity output 
a1)  Market Price Support ECUmn 
Wheat  ECUmn 
 
5,712.50 4,776.49 1,133.41 13.06 16.97 0 0 
Milk  18,248.56 15,386.54 18,385.88 12,249.36 2,443.13 0 137.13 
Wine 749.83 1,051.69 527.85 252.6 108,85 2.17 0 
a2)  Payments based on output  ECUmn 
-          National output payments for wine ECUmn 0 0 0 0.73 0.48 0.03 0.02 
  
 
 
 
 
does take into consideration the consumer support 
estimate (CSE). As a consequence, PSCT value of wine is 
lower than what one would expect. One of the reason of 
this reduction is also (probably) due to negotiations in the 
WTO – Uruguay Round of the GATT, which required a 
reduction in protection (tariff and non tariff barriers) aimed 
to eliminate all agricultural policies with a distortive effect 
on trade flows and export subsidies. Financial aspects and 
pressure from the commencement of the GATT 
negotiations were probably among the most important 
contribution factor to determining the reorientation of EU 
agricultural policies. Concluding, the PSE and PSCT used 
in the present paper, even if they don't perfectly represent 
the set of producer support for the wine sector, could be 
used as policy indicators especially if compared with other 
commodities insight the PAC. 
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